Superstition

Reflections on Superstitions

With our present analysis we probed the psychology of superstition at a number of levels. For one thing, the analysis offers an account for why people might be hesitant to do things that they fear will lead to a bad outcome even when they cannot provide a rational account for the fear. People’s hesitancies to switch lines or throw out long-held possessions qualify as examples of this type. People often claim that although they do not know the reason that when they throw out some long-unused object they soon find themselves needing it, they know it is so and engage in the practice only against their better judgment (e.g., “You know, I have had this bat repellent for 10 years and have never used it, but – just you wait – now that I’m throwing it out, we’ll be infested with bats”). The previously discussed Spanish superstition against matador substitution provides an even more dramatic example of this process.

Of course, many behaviors having the same psychological underpinnings as superstitions do not seem to be superstitions because they are assumed to be rational. The reason that blackjack players stand when they are holding 16 may have everything to do with nascent feelings of anticipatory regret, but the players appear to think the strategy merely reflects playing the odds. Indeed, Meyer Lansky, the legendary crime figure and reputed gambling genius, regularly instructed blackjack players that the odds dictated that one hold at 16. The mistaken belief that the odds dictate standing at 16 might even increase with experience. Keren and Wagenaar (1985) found that experienced blackjack players frequently claimed that amateurs could be distinguished from the professional gamblers because of their tendency to take too many cards.

The fact that psychologically painful sequences (regardless of whether the pain is produced by self-recriminations) tend to be memorable sequences may underlie a great many superstitions. We ask the reader to consider which of the following sequences is more common in his or her experience: (1) The data from the first few research participants look good and look even better when you have run 15 per cell; or (2) the data from the first few participants look good but turn to mush by the time you have run 15 per cell. Many researchers may share our intuition that the latter sequence is much more common than the former (even allowing for regression to the mean); in fact, many may even share our belief that one should not look at early data because doing so “jinxes” them. We suggest that this belief (superstition?) emerges because of the tendency for bad data following good data to be so painful. Sequences that raise and then dash hopes are more available in memory, and therefore lead to the formation of erroneous beliefs.