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Mental Models

Black Swan Problem

The Black Swan Problem highlights how rare, high-impact events are underestimated due to their infrequency, invisibility of risk generators, and human tendency to undervalue protection against unlikely disasters.

THE IDEA

An Even More Vicious Roulette

Reality is far more vicious than Russian roulette. First, it delivers the fatal bullet rather infrequently, like a revolver that would have hundreds, even thousands, of chambers instead of six. After a few dozen tries, one forgets about the existence of a bullet, under a numbing false sense of security. This is the black swan problem (also known as the turkey problem or the problem of induction), a puzzle that is ancient, predating its usual association with David Hume by centuries—as old as philosophy itself. Though often called “Hume’s problem,” it was formulated with no less precision by the ancients, and the core challenge of drawing universal conclusions from limited experience has troubled thinkers for millennia. Hume, incidentally, was far from the tormented skeptic of stereotype: he was jovial, a bon vivant, practical-minded, and sociable, reminding us that deep doubt does not require gloom. The problem is also related to a tendency called denigration of history: gamblers, investors, and decision-makers feel that the sorts of things that happen to others would not necessarily happen to them.

Second, unlike a well-defined, precise game like Russian roulette, where the risks are visible to anyone capable of multiplying and dividing by six, one does not observe the barrel of reality. Very rarely is the generator visible to the naked eye. One is thus capable of unwittingly playing Russian roulette—and calling it by some alternative “low risk” name. We see the wealth being generated, never the processor, a matter that makes people lose sight of their risks, and never consider the losers. The game seems terribly easy and we play along carelessly. Even scientists with all their sophistication in calculating probabilities cannot deliver any meaningful answer about the odds, since knowledge of these depends on our witnessing the barrel of reality—of which we generally know nothing.

Finally, there is an ingratitude factor in warning people about something abstract (by definition anything that did not happen is abstract). Say you engage in a business of protecting investors from rare events by constructing packages that shield them from their sting. Say that nothing happens during the period. Some investors will complain about your spending their money; some will even try to make you feel sorry: “You wasted my money on insurance last year; the factory did not burn, it was a stupid expense. You should only insure for events that happen.” One investor came to see me fully expecting me to be apologetic (it did not work). But the world is not that homogeneous: there are some (though very few) who will call you to express their gratitude and thank you for having protected them from the events that did not take place.

When to use it

  • Predicting financial market trends based on historical data

  • Evaluating the safety of a drug based on limited clinical trials

  • Making everyday assumptions about people's behavior based on past interactions

  • Investment portfolio management: incorporating tail risk hedging strategies.

  • Personal finance: purchasing insurance for low-probability, high-impact events.

  • Business continuity planning: preparing for rare disruptions like natural disasters or cyberattacks.

  • Public health policy: investing in pandemic preparedness despite low historical frequency.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Turkey Problem

A turkey is fed every day, so it assumes it will be fed tomorrow, but on Thanksgiving it is slaughtered. Its expectation rests on induction, which cannot guarantee the next outcome.

02

Black Swan Metaphor

In the past, Europeans assumed all swans were white based on observations, but discovering black swans in Australia showed that a single counterexample can falsify a universal generalization.

03

Investor complacency before market crashes

After a long period of market stability, investors may ignore the possibility of a crash, believing that past calm ensures future safety, only to be caught off guard when a rare but severe downturn occurs.

04

Insurance value perception

A homeowner cancels flood insurance after several years without a flood, feeling the premium was wasted, but then suffers catastrophic losses when an unexpected flood finally occurs.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. How does the problem of induction affect your belief in scientific theories?

  2. Can you think of a time when you made an inductive assumption that turned out to be wrong?

  3. How can we mitigate the risks of inductive reasoning in decision-making?

  4. In what areas of your life or work might you be underestimating the probability and impact of rare events?

  5. How can you better identify the 'generator' of risks that is not immediately visible in your decisions?

  6. When someone advises you to take protective measures against improbable events, how do you typically react, and does this align with the ingratitude factor described?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • Fooled by Randomness The Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and in Life (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
  • The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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