Affective Role of Counterfactuals

AFFECTIVE ROLE OF COUNTERFACTUALS

This section develops some implications of the analysis of counterfactual thought for the domain of affect. We examine this question in conjunction with a hypothesis of emotional amplification that states that the affective response to an event is enhanced if its causes are abnormal. In each of the following examples, the same misfortune is produced by two sequences of events that differ in normality. The respondents assess the intensity of the affective responses that are likely to arise in the two situations. The first demonstration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) tested the prediction that outcomes that are easily undone by constructing an alternative scenario tend to elicit strong affective reactions.

Mr. C and Mr. D were scheduled to leave the airport on different flights at the same time. They traveled from town in the same limousine, were caught in a traffic jam, and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure time of their flights. Mr. D is told that his flight left on time. Mr. C is told that his flight was delayed, and only left 5 minutes ago. Who is more upset?

There is essentially unanimous agreement that Mr. C is more upset than Mr. D, although their objective situations are identical – both have missed their planes. Furthermore, their expectations were also identical because both had expected to miss their planes. The difference in the affective state of the two men appears to arise from the availability of a counterfactual construction. Mr. C and Mr. D differ in the ease with which they can imagine themselves – contrary to fact – catching up with their flights. This is easier for Mr. C, who needs only to imagine making up 5 minutes, than for Mr. D, who must construct a scenario in which he makes up half an hour. A preferred alternative is thus more available (normal) for Mr. C than for Mr. D, which makes his experience more upsetting.

The next demonstration tests the prediction that outcomes that follow exceptional actions – and therefore seem abnormal – will elicit stronger affective reactions than outcomes of routine actions.

Mr. Adams was involved in an accident when driving home after work on his regular route. Mr. White was involved in a similar accident when driving on a route that he only takes when he wants a change of scenery. Who is more upset over the accident?

As predicted, the same undesirable outcome is judged to be more upsetting when the action that led to it was exceptional than when it was routine.

The next example tests the prediction that people are most apt to regret actions that are out of character:

Mr. Jones almost never takes hitchhikers in his car. Yesterday he gave a man a ride and was robbed. Mr. Smith frequently takes hitchhikers in his car. Yesterday he gave a man a ride and was robbed. Who do you expect to experience greater regret over the episode?

Who will be criticized most severely by others?

The results confirm the hypothesis and, incidentally, indicate that regret cannot be identified with an internalization of others’ blame.

The final example (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) tests the hypothesis that consequences of actions evoke stronger emotional responses than consequences of failures to act. The intuition to which this example appeals is that it is usually easier to imagine oneself abstaining from actions that one has carried out than carrying out actions that were not in fact performed.

Mr. Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year, he considered switching to stock in Company B, but decided against it. He now finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had switched to the stock of Company B. Mr. George owned shares in Company B. During the past year he switched to stock in Company A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept his stock in Company B. Who feels greater regret?

The finding that acts of commission produce greater regret than acts of omission was replicated by Landman (1987) and is in accord with formulations that distinguish omission from commission in attributions of causality and responsibility (Hart & Honore, 1959; Heider, 1958).

Miller and McFarland (1986) conducted a series of studies to test the hypothesis that the abnormality of a victim’s fate affects the sympathy that the victim receives from others. Subjects were told that the purpose of the studies was to provide victim compensation boards with information about the public’s view of various types of victims. Subjects were presented with a brief description of an incident and then were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale how much compensation they thought the victim should receive. Normality was manipulated in one study by varying the mutability of an action that led to a bad outcome. The victim was a man who had been severely injured during a robbery. In one condition, the robbery took place in the store at which the victim shopped most frequently. In a second condition, the robbery took place in a store to which the victim had decided to go only after finding his regular store closed for renovations. It was predicted that subjects would view the fate that befell the victim in the “unusual” store to be more abnormal, and hence more unjust, than the fate that befell the victim in the “usual” store. Consistent with this hypothesis, subjects recommended significantly more compensation (more than $100,000 more) for the same injury in the exceptional context than they did in the routine context.

This study demonstrates that even morally charged judgments such as those involving compensation can be influenced by the normality of the outcome. It is as though a negative fate for which a more positive contrast is highly available is worse or more unfair than one for which there is no highly available positive alternative. It is important to note that the different reaction to the two victims is not due to the perceived probability of their fate. The probabilities of being shot in the two stores were both judged very low and indistinguishable from one another. The subjects apparently presupposed both the robbery and the store at which it took place. Given this presupposition, it is relatively more normal for an individual to be shot where it is normal for that individual to be – in the store that is regularly frequented.

A second compensation study, paralleling the missed-flight script, varied the distance between the negative outcome and a more positive alternative. The victim in this study had died from exposure after surviving a plane crash in a remote area. He had made it to within 75 miles of safety in one condition and to within mile in the second condition. Assuming that it is easier to imagine an individual continuing another mile than another 75 miles, it was predicted that the fate of the “close” victim would be perceived to be more abnormal, and hence more unfair, than the fate of the “distant” victim. The results supported the prediction, inasmuch as subjects once again recommended significantly more compensation for the family of the victim whose fate was more easily undone.

These results confirm the correlation between the perception of abnormality of an event and the intensity of the affective reaction to it, whether the affective reaction be one of regret, horror, or outrage. This correlation can have consequences that violate other rules of justice. An example that attracted international attention a few years ago was the bombing of a synagog in Paris, in which some people who happened to be walking their dogs near the building were killed in the blast. Condemning the incident, a government official singled out the tragedy of the “innocent passers-by.” The official’s embarrassing comment, with its apparent (surely unintended) implication that the other victims were not innocent, merely reflects a general intuition: The death of a person who was not an intended target is more poignant than the death of a target. Unfortunately, there is only a small step from this intuition to the sense that the persons who are chosen as targets thereby lose some of their innocence.