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Heuristics

Take The Best Heuristic

Take the Best compares two options by checking cues in order of their predictive validity. It stops at the first cue that distinguishes them and predicts from that cue alone. In the studies summarized here, it required far fewer computations than regression and remained competitive when tested on held-out data.

THE IDEA

Take the Best checks cues in order of their predictive validity and stops at the first cue that distinguishes the two objects being compared. The cue’s direction determines the prediction. If no cue distinguishes them, the heuristic guesses. The comparison below concerns the effort required to learn and apply that rule.

How Much Information Processing Is Performed?

In the studies summarized here, Take the Best and Minimalist stopped searching after looking up fewer than one-third of the available cues on average. That measures information use. To measure computational effort, we also need to count the operations used in training and prediction.

Let us begin by measuring the amount of learning required by the heuristics to build their models in order to perform their predictions later. We can use the suggestion of Newell and Simon (1972) and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1990) – count the number of elementary information processing (EIP) units necessary for the training phase. These EIPs include addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, comparison of two numbers, reading a number, writing a number, and so on. For each such operation, we count 1 unit. These EIP units are easy to count, and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1990) present experimental evidence that they are a reasonable estimate of the cognitive effort involved in executing a particular choice strategy in a specific task environment. For our tasks, the number of EIPs required depends on N, the number of objects, and M, the number of cues in the data set. Approximate EIP counts for any N and M, along with the specific values for predicting homelessness (N = 50, M = 6), show that fast and frugal heuristics require dramatically fewer calculations in the training phase than multiple regression. The training phase of Take The Best and Minimalist involves orders of magnitude fewer operations than the regression’s lower bound of roughly 20,000 EIPs (even without invertibility and computer overflow checks). In practical applications, fast and frugal heuristics might require as little as 1/100 of the operations. Note that we differ from earlier theorists such as Dawes (1979) in including learning the direction of cues as a real problem; other theorists have assumed this is known already, making fast and frugal heuristics even simpler.

Of course, learning a model of the data is only the first step. Implementing the heuristic has a cost, too. The number of EIPs in the test phase reveals that the heuristics in these comparisons use fewer operations than the more complex strategies, because they examine fewer cues and perform fewer calculations on them. Because fast and frugal heuristics generally do not use all of the available cues, we also need to consider the actual number of cues looked up. For example, Take the Best uses, on average, only 2.4 cues for predicting homelessness. The test-phase EIPs show that the cue-based predictions of Minimalist and Take the Best are about 5 times simpler than the simplest linear model, Dawes' Rule, and about 10 times simpler than Multiple Regression. They are faster even if some processing is done in parallel; under parallel cue validation, the total calculations would remain the same but would be completed more quickly, and they would still be more frugal.

Yet, how well do these computationally minimal heuristics actually predict? Performance on predicting homelessness, measured by the percentage of correct pairwise inferences, offers initial answers. When the test set coincides with the training set (fitting), Take the Best, which uses only 2.4 cues on average, scores higher than Dawes’ Rule, which uses all six cues, and is almost as accurate as linear regression, which performs complex calculations on all cues. In fact, across 20 different real-world environments, Take the Best competes favorably not only with Dawes’ Rule and multiple regression but also with much more sophisticated methods like Bayesian networks. For homelessness prediction, when the test set equals the training set, Take the Best is about 8 percentage points less accurate than a Bayesian network, but it is only 2 percentage points behind that network when the test set is different (cross-validation). In the fish fertility data, the large dataset produced stable results for all methods under cross-validation. For predicting professors’ salaries, Take the Best was 4 percentage points behind the Bayesian network in same-set tests but nearly matched it in cross-validation. Across these studies, a consistent pattern emerges: complex models like Bayesian networks and multiple regression achieve higher accuracy when fitting known data, but their advantage shrinks to as little as 1–2 percentage points when generalizing to new data. For the homelessness data, a Profile Memorization Method stores the cue profiles and outcomes but omits city names. It reaches only 82% correct, rather than 100%, because some cities with the same recorded cues have different outcomes. This limits what those cues can distinguish; it does not establish that homelessness is inherently unpredictable with other information.

Across the reported cross-validation comparisons, Take the Best was more accurate than regression on average, despite its lower computational cost.

One explanation is that Take the Best estimates relatively little: it used only 2.4 cues on average in the homelessness task. If the strongest cues and their ranking remain stable across samples, they can support useful predictions without estimating all cue weights and correlations. More elaborate models can overfit small training sets. This advantage depends on the data: a stopping rule can also discard useful evidence, so its accuracy should be assessed on held-out cases.

When to use it

  • Compare simple stopping rules with fuller models in simulations where decision time is limited.

  • Study whether a few job-relevant criteria predict later performance on held-out hiring data.

  • Compare pairwise social or economic predictions when only a small set of cues is available.

  • Everyday consumer choices (e.g., selecting a product by comparing only the most important feature).

  • Evaluate a symptom-based stopping rule on labeled cases before considering clinical use.

  • Test a ranked-indicator forecasting rule against a baseline on historical data held out from training.

  • Teach the difference between stopping at a discriminating cue and adding weighted criteria.

  • Measure the accuracy lost or gained when a decision model must stop searching early.

  • Assess how often a time-limited model reaches a decision before exhausting its cues.

  • Explore how small training samples affect a simple rule and a fitted regression model.

  • Compare the number of lookups and calculations required by competing decision rules.

  • Model pairwise choices in which lower-ranked cues do not compensate for the first discriminating cue.

  • Test route-selection rules in a simulation with known travel outcomes and time constraints.

  • Consumer decisions with limited information, like choosing a product based on one key feature.

  • Study whether a triage cue predicts urgency on labeled cases, including the cost of missed cases.

  • Compare prediction time when cues are checked sequentially or retrieved in parallel.

  • Assess how missing or noisy cues change a rule’s accuracy on held-out data.

  • Demonstrate why fitting known data and predicting new cases require separate comparisons.

  • Consumer choice when faced with many product attributes, focusing on a single key feature.

  • Check whether the ranking of hiring criteria remains stable across different applicant samples.

  • Use a hypothetical treatment comparison to show what evidence a stopping rule leaves unused.

  • Compare an investment indicator’s apparent training accuracy with its performance on later observations.

  • Study how changes in cue validity affect a rule that stops at its first discriminating cue.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Predicting homelessness: New Orleans vs. Miami

When comparing New Orleans and Miami, both cities have identical cue values on all six dimensions (temperature, rent control, poverty, etc.). In such a tie, the Take the Best heuristic guesses, earning a score of 0.5 correct on average.

02

Take the Best versus Dawes' Rule and regression

In the homelessness prediction task, Take the Best used only 2.4 cues on average but outperformed Dawes' Rule (which uses all 6 cues) and nearly matched linear regression (which also uses all cues and performs complex calculations).

03

Homelessness Prediction

In a study predicting homelessness with 50 cities and 6 cues, Take the Best used on average only 2.4 cues, requiring far fewer Elementary Information Processing Units (EIPs) than multiple regression, yet achieving comparable or better accuracy in cross-validation.

04

Medical Diagnosis

In a hypothetical classification task, a model ranks symptoms by how well they distinguish two diagnoses. It checks them in that order and stops at the first discriminating symptom. This illustrates the stopping rule; the computational comparison alone does not establish its clinical accuracy.

05

Consumer Purchasing

A buyer ranks price ahead of brand reputation. If price distinguishes two products, the buyer stops there; brand matters only if price does not distinguish them. Combining both cues would be a different rule.

06

Predicting city population

To predict which of two cities is larger, rank available cues by their measured validity in suitable training data. If capital status ranks first and only one city is a capital, choose that city and stop. If both have the same status, check the next cue.

07

A symptom that does not distinguish

Suppose a classification exercise compares two diseases that both cause a rash. The presence of a rash does not distinguish them, so Take the Best moves to the next ranked cue. The cue must separate the alternatives before it can determine the prediction.

08

City Population Prediction

Consider a population-comparison model that ranks the presence of a major airport as its strongest cue. When only one city has such an airport, Take the Best predicts that city is larger. Whether this rule matches a Bayesian network or regression requires testing on held-out city pairs.

09

Homelessness Prediction Accuracy

In predicting homelessness, Take the Best was 8 percentage points less accurate than a Bayesian network when the test set matched the training set. Under cross-validation (test set different from training set), the gap narrowed to only 2 percentage points, illustrating the heuristic's robustness.

010

Fish Fertility Data Set

Using cues like fish weight, age, and average egg weight to predict the number of eggs in a fish (395 individuals), all methods produced stable results under cross-validation. The large dataset helped maintain consistency.

011

Professors' Salary Prediction

Predicting whether one professor earns more than another using cues like gender, rank, years in rank, highest degree, and years since degree. Take the Best lagged 4 percentage points behind the Bayesian network in same-set tests, but almost caught up under cross-validation.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Why might a heuristic that uses only a few cues sometimes outperform a model that uses all available information?

  2. What evidence would persuade you that a simple stopping rule is accurate enough for a particular task?

  3. Which limits on time, information, or computation does Take the Best address?

  4. Which operations would you count as EIPs in a decision you make regularly?

  5. How would you estimate cue validity without using the cases reserved for testing?

  6. What are the trade-offs between accuracy and computational simplicity in real-world decisions?

  7. When could several weak cues together outperform the strongest cue alone?

  8. How might estimating fewer parameters reduce overfitting in a small sample?

  9. What should the rule do when every available cue has the same value for both options?

  10. How would changing the order of two highly ranked cues affect predictions?

  11. Recall a quick decision based on a single cue. Did you know how well that cue predicted the outcome?

  12. What costs of finding a cue might an operation count overlook?

  13. How could a change in the population make a formerly useful cue misleading?

  14. What would you compare on held-out data before choosing between Take the Best and a Bayesian network?

  15. When would a cue-profile ceiling reveal missing information rather than an unavoidable limit on prediction?

  16. Why can strong performance on training data fail to carry over to new cases?

  17. How would you check whether the cue ranking remains stable across samples?

  18. How would unequal costs of mistakes affect your choice of prediction rule?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

References

  1. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality — Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996)
  2. Human Problem Solving — Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1972)
  3. The Adaptive Decision Maker — Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1990)
  4. The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models — Dawes, R. M. (1979)
  5. Modeling Fast and Frugal Heuristics — Czerlinski, J. (1997)
  6. Goldstein & Gigerenzer (1996) paper on fast and frugal heuristics — Goldstein, D. G. and Gigerenzer, G. (1996)

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
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