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Cognitive Biases

Stiglitz Syndrome

Taleb uses the label Stiglitz syndrome for experts who select past statements after an event and claim foresight without bearing the consequences of error. His proposed check is to compare their advice with their own exposure to the risk.

THE IDEA

Stiglitz Syndrome = fragilista (with good intentions) + ex post cherry-picking

There are other lessons here, related to the absence of penalty. This is an illustration of the academics-who-write-papers-and-talk syndrome in its greatest severity (unless, as we will see, they have their soul in it). So many academics propose something in one paper, then the opposite in another paper, without penalty to themselves from having been wrong in the first paper since there is a need only for consistency within a single paper, not across one’s career. This would be fine, as someone may evolve and contradict earlier beliefs, but then the earlier “result” should be withdrawn from circulation and superseded with a new one—with books, the new edition supersedes the preceding one. This absence of penalty makes them antifragile at the expense of the society that accepts the “rigor” of their results. Further, I am not doubting Stiglitz’s sincerity, or some weak form of sincerity: I believe he genuinely thinks he predicted the financial crisis, so let me rephrase the problem: the problem with people who do not incur harm is that they can cherry-pick from statements they’ve made in the past, many of them contradictory, and end up convincing themselves of their intellectual lucidity on the way to the World Economic Forum at Davos.

There is the iatrogenics of the medical charlatan and snake oil salesperson causing harm, but he sort of knows it and lies low after he is caught. And there is a far more vicious form of iatrogenics by experts who use their more acceptable status to claim later that they warned of harm. As these did not know they were causing iatrogenics, they cure iatrogenics with iatrogenics. Then things explode.

Finally, the cure to many ethical problems maps to the exact cure for the Stiglitz effect, which I state now.

Never ask anyone for their opinion, forecast, or recommendation. Just ask them what they have—or don’t have—in their portfolio.

We now know that many innocent retirees have been harmed by the incompetence of the rating agencies—it was a bit more than incompetence. Many subprime loans were toxic waste dressed as “AAA,” meaning near-government grade in safety. People were innocently led into putting their savings into them—and, further, regulators were forcing portfolio managers to use the assessment of the rating agencies. But rating agencies are protected: they present themselves as press—without the noble mission of the press to expose frauds. And they benefit from the protection of free speech—the “First Amendment” so ingrained in American habits. My humble proposal: one should say whatever he wants, but one’s portfolio needs to line up with it. And, of course, regulators should not be fragilistas by giving their stamp to predictive approaches—hence junk science.

The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has a simple heuristic. Never ask the doctor what you should do. Ask him what he would do if he were in your place. You would be surprised at the difference.

When to use it

  • Evaluating financial analysts: Before trusting a market prediction, check their personal investment portfolio or track record of published forecasts.

  • Medical decision-making: When a doctor recommends a treatment, ask what they would choose for themselves or their family under the same circumstances.

  • Regulatory policy: Design regulations that require forecasters and rating agencies to have personal financial stake in the accuracy of their predictions to reduce iatrogenics.

  • Hiring consultants: Instead of asking for a report, require consultants to tie their compensation to the outcomes of their recommendations.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Financial Crisis Prediction

An economist makes contradictory predictions about the economy over years. After a crisis occurs, they selectively cite one earlier statement that hinted at a downturn, claiming they foresaw the crisis, while ignoring many incorrect forecasts. Their portfolio (investments, reputation) does not reflect genuine belief in their prediction.

02

Rating Agency Failures

Taleb criticizes rating agencies for assigning AAA ratings to securities that later harmed investors. He argues that their incentives and claimed protections insulated them from the downside borne by those who relied on the ratings. This is his critique of the historical episode.

03

Doctor's Advice Heuristic

Taleb attributes a question to Gerd Gigerenzer: ask what the doctor would choose in your circumstances. This can open a discussion about assumptions and preferences; it does not replace examining the treatment evidence or your own priorities.

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A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Think of a time an expert claimed to have predicted an outcome after the fact. What contradictory statements might they have made earlier? How could you verify their claims using the portfolio heuristic?

  2. In your own field, what systems allow experts to avoid penalty for wrong predictions? How might you redesign incentives to align with the portfolio-based cure?

  3. Consider a recent news story about a financial or medical expert. Apply the 'ask what they have in their portfolio' test. Does their personal risk-taking match their public advice?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

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Source texts

  • Antifragile (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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