Self-Anchoring and Adjustment
When making judgments under uncertainty, people often anchor on initial values (even irrelevant ones) and then insufficiently adjust, resulting in biased judgments. This cognitive bias also applies to language use, where interlocutors anchor on their own perspective and inadequately adjust to their partner's viewpoint.
THE IDEA
When making judgments under uncertainty, people often anchor their responses to particular values – even irrelevant values – and adjust as needed (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; see also a review in Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001). Such anchoring has been demonstrated in a variety of content domains with a variety of tasks. Anchoring occurs even when the exposure to the anchor value is completely incidental to the main task (e.g., Wilson, Houston, Brekke, & Etling, 1996). People show anchoring in diverse tasks, from the evaluation of utilities, to the prediction of future performance, to the attribution of causes of behavior (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1985; Switzer & Sniezek, 1991; Quattrone, 1982). Anchoring coupled with insufficient adjustment typically results in a biased judgment (e.g., Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Griffin and Tversky (1992), for example, used an anchoring and adjustment theory to explain why people are often over- or underconfident in their judgments. They found that people tend to anchor on the strength of evidence while insufficiently adjusting for what they know about the weight of the evidence.
Faced with the uncertainty of language, we propose that interlocutors also use such anchoring and adjustment. Instead of using information that is shared with their conversational partner, they anchor on their egocentric perspective and then attempt to adjust to their partner’s perspective (Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998). We call this the perspective adjustment theory of language use. Thus, when addressees attempt to understand what speakers mean, they use an egocentric perspective. They also monitor for egocentric interpretations that violate the assumption that interpretations should rely on mutual knowledge. For example, if the egocentric interpretation uses information that is inaccessible to the speaker, the addressee detects the violation and readjusts the interpretation to align with the speaker’s perspective. This adjustment, however, is often insufficient, resulting in egocentrically anchored interpretation errors.
When to use it
In salary negotiations, the first offer often anchors the subsequent counteroffers and final settlement.
When assigning probabilities to events, an anchor (e.g., a base rate or a representative example) can skew the final estimate if adjustment is insufficient.
In designing surveys, the order of options can anchor respondents' choices, affecting the results.
In language comprehension, listeners initially interpret ambiguous statements based on their own knowledge, requiring adjustment to understand the speaker's intended meaning.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Overconfidence in judgment
Griffin and Tversky (1992) showed that people anchor on the strength of evidence (e.g., how compelling a story is) but insufficiently adjust for the weight of evidence (e.g., sample size or reliability), leading to overconfidence when strong evidence is light and underconfidence when weak evidence is heavy.
Egocentric interpretation in communication
Keysar, Barr, and Horton (1998) demonstrated that listeners initially interpret ambiguous statements from their own perspective, then try to adjust to the speaker's perspective. This adjustment is often incomplete, leading to misunderstandings when the listener's private knowledge conflicts with the speaker's intended meaning.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Can you recall a situation where an initial number or value heavily influenced your final decision, even though you knew the anchor was arbitrary?
How might insufficient adjustment from an ego-centric perspective lead to misunderstandings in your everyday conversations?
What strategies could you use to reduce the influence of anchoring when making important judgments or predictions?
References
- Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982) — Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982)
- Tversky & Kahneman (1974) — Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974)
- Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey (2001) — Griffin, D., Gonzalez, R., & Varey, C. (2001)
- Wilson, Houston, Brekke, & Etling (1996) — Wilson, T. D., Houston, C. E., Brekke, N., & Etling, K. M. (1996)
- Gilbert & Osborne (1989) — Gilbert, D. T. & Osborne, R. E. (1989)
- Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull (1988) — Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988)
- Hershey & Schoemaker (1985) — Hershey, J. C. & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1985)
- Switzer & Sniezek (1991) — Switzer, F. S. & Sniezek, J. A. (1991)
- Quattrone (1982) — Quattrone, G. A. (1982)
- Slovic & Lichtenstein (1971) — Slovic, P. & Lichtenstein, S. (1971)
- Griffin & Tversky (1992) — Griffin, D. & Tversky, A. (1992)
- Keysar, Barr, & Horton (1998) — Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., & Horton, W. S. (1998)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)