Reification
Reification becomes a reasoning error when an abstraction is treated as a concrete entity and unsupported properties or powers are inferred from it. Personifying Nature or speaking of what a government does can be harmless shorthand; the question is whether the argument relies on taking that language literally.
THE IDEA
Reification
Robert Sinclair
Objects derive their influence not from properties inherent in them; but from such as are bestowed upon them by the minds of those who are conversant with or affected by these objects. —John Ruskin, Modern Painters
Reification is the fallacy of treating an abstraction—an idea, concept, or hypothetical construct—as if it were a concrete, real event or physical entity with causal powers. The error consists in assuming that something which has only abstract existence possesses a material existence of its own. Common targets include concepts like ‘nation,’ ‘state,’ ‘nature,’ and ‘race.’
Take the familiar expression “It’s not nice to fool Mother Nature.” Here, ‘Nature’ is an abstraction naming a sequence of natural events, but the expression assigns it a material human character. Nature is not a person and cannot be fooled. When used metaphorically, such reifications are relatively harmless—a deliberate rhetorical device intended to evoke emotion or vivid imagery. Saying “the street told me to turn left” or cursing at a malfunctioning computer treats inanimate objects as sentient, but these are not arguments. The pathetic fallacy, a related variation, specifically attributes human feelings or sensations to inanimate things. As long as the reification is not offered as evidence for a claim, it remains an acceptable figure of speech.
Reification becomes problematic when an argument relies on properties an abstraction has not been shown to possess. Consider the following:
The State controls the business world and has its hand in everyone’s pocket. By limiting this governmental pickpocketing, we can prevent such obstructions to our individual rights and freedoms.
Calling taxation pickpocketing invites us to view it as theft by a person. That characterization needs an argument about the policies, their effects, and the rights at stake. Governments can act through officials and institutions, so describing government action is not inherently fallacious; imagining a single thief does not establish that the policies are wrong (Dewey 2012, 41–59). Similarly, “the Bible says…” can be ordinary shorthand for a passage in a text. It becomes misleading if an argument uses that shorthand to bypass questions about authorship, translation, interpretation, or the authority being claimed.
Avoiding this mistaken reasoning requires refraining from assigning unsupported causal agency to abstractions. A more careful argument would say:
The policies of the current government (an organized group of public officials) seek to control the economic transactions within the business community and use taxation to limit the income of its citizens. Such actions are not in the interest of either the business community or its citizens. The public officials who are implementing such policies do so wrongly. In order to prevent this we must limit such actions by taking the needed step to remove these individuals from public office.
This version identifies policies and officials whose actions can be examined. It still needs evidence for its claims about their effects and an argument for the proposed response.
The standard analysis presents reification as a fallacy of presumption that can be avoided by minimizing the assignment of causal agency to abstractions. But there are deeper consequences—what pragmatist philosophers William James and John Dewey called “pernicious reification” (Winther 2014, 9). Both philosophers recognized the indispensable value of abstract thought (Dewey 1920, 86–87; James 1997, 246–247; also see Quine 2015, 17–19), but they warned against misusing our aptitude for abstraction and classification.
Abstract concepts like ‘elasticity’ or ‘voluminousness’ apply only partially to any physical body; a judgment that someone is a ‘drunkard’ can harden into an overly universal claim about that person’s identity. Dewey and James argued that abstractions are purpose-driven and provide only partial descriptions—useful for understanding and intervention but easily overextended (James 1997, 246–250; Winther 2014, 1). The mistake occurs when we forget the context and function of an abstraction, using it rigidly and ontologically definitively (Winther 2014, 9–17).
James called this ‘vicious abstractionism’: singling out certain features of a situation and treating that abstraction as a complete description (James 1997, 249; Winther 2014, 10–11). A person who kills is labeled wholly and exclusively as a ‘murderer,’ ignoring other features such as being a father or a policeman. This oversimplification ignores the network of other concepts that might be relevant for different explanatory aims. The error is forgetting the specific, local function of the concept—leading to classifications that are both too narrow and too universal.
Dewey labeled the broader tendency the “philosophic fallacy,” in which a failure to note function and context leads philosophers to convert “eventual functions into antecedent existence” (Dewey 1929, 29; Pappas 2008, 26–29). All reasoning is selective, but when that selectivity is ignored, the chosen abstraction is mistaken for a pre-existing, finished reality. Dewey saw the empirical method of modern science as a safeguard, keeping attention on the initial decision and preventing these reifications. He criticized, for example, the psychological concept of the ‘reflex arc,’ where stimulus and response were treated as fixed antecedent realities rather than as a functional distinction within an integrated, continuous coordination of behavior (Winther 2014, 15).
The consequences of pernicious reification extend beyond abstract philosophy. Abstract reasoning is fundamental to both science and everyday life, and its abuse can produce inaccurate scientific explanations and damaging social outcomes (Duster 2005). For instance, biological data used in debates about the reality of ‘race’ often fail to distinguish between competing claims about racial classification (Kaplan and Winther 2013, 410). Reifying socially recognized races in biology can obscure the role of social circumstances in observed differences between groups. Treating a classification as a complete explanation can misdirect both research and policy.
When to use it
In a moral debate, ask what reasons support a claim such as 'Justice demands that we...' rather than treating the personification itself as proof or as a fallacy.
In business, unpack 'The market wants lower prices' into claims about particular customers, purchasing behavior, and evidence.
In personal reasoning, treat 'My gut tells me this is wrong' as a report of intuition, then examine what supports or challenges that judgment.
In rhetoric: Using phrases like 'Nature says we should...' to support an argument by treating nature as a speaking authority.
In political rhetoric, distinguish legitimate descriptions of institutional action from unsupported assumptions that a government has one mind or motive.
Evaluating scientific debates about the biological reality of social categories like 'race' to identify hidden reifications.
Critiquing economic arguments that personify 'the market' as having desires or intentions.
Improving clarity in psychological or sociological explanations by avoiding reified distinctions, such as the reflex arc in behaviorism.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
The Street Told Me to Turn Left
Saying that a street told someone to turn left personifies it. As shorthand for following its layout or signs, this is not a fallacious argument. The error would require an inference that depends on the street literally having intentions.
The Bible Says...
'The Bible says...' can simply identify words in a text. To assess an argument, ask which passage and interpretation are intended and why its authority should support the conclusion; the phrase alone does not establish a fallacy.
Cursing at a Computer
Cursing at a malfunctioning computer may express frustration or personify the machine. It is not, by itself, an argument. Reasoning goes wrong if assumed feelings or intentions replace an explanation of how the device works.
The State as a pickpocket
An argument that 'The State controls the business world and has its hand in everyone's pocket' reifies the State by assigning it human-like desires to control and steal. This faulty reasoning presumes the State has concrete agency, ignoring that it is a legal entity composed of individuals. A more effective argument would focus on specific policies and the actions of public officials.
Mother Nature
The expression 'It's not nice to fool Mother Nature' reifies Nature by treating it as a human-like being capable of being fooled. While metaphorical, such language can lead to faulty reasoning if used as the basis for an argument about natural events.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Recall a personified abstraction in an advertisement or speech. Was it imagery, or did the argument depend on treating it literally? What inference did the wording invite?
When someone says 'History teaches us...', what evidence or comparison are they referring to? Is the personification hiding an unsupported inference or simply introducing one?
Have you explained a failure by treating an object or abstraction as if it had intentions? What mechanism or specific action would give a clearer explanation?
Think of a common abstract term like 'justice' or 'freedom'. Can you identify a situation where it has been reified, leading to faulty reasoning about policies or actions?
How might the reification of the concept 'race' in biological discourse affect social policies and our understanding of human welfare disparities?
Consider the phrase 'the market decides'—in what ways does this reify the market as a conscious agent? How could you restate the argument to avoid this fallacy?
References
- The Public and Its Problems — John Dewey (2012)
- Essays in Radical Empiricism — William James (1997)
- Reification as a Fallacy — Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2014)
- Word and Object — Willard Van Orman Quine (2015)
- The Philosophy of John Dewey — John Dewey (1920)
- John Dewey’s Experience and Nature — John Dewey (1929)
- The Continuity of Dewey’s Thought — George Pappas (2008)
- Race and Reification in Science — Troy Duster (2005)
- The Politics of Species — Jonathan Kaplan and Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2013)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Bad Arguments 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy (Steven Barbone, Michael Bruce)
- Logically Fallacious - The Ultimate Collection of Over 300 Logical Fallacies