Reality? What For?
Taleb argues that forecasting methods should earn their complexity by outperforming simple baselines. He uses the M-Competitions and his own trading experience to criticize rewarding mathematical sophistication without sufficient attention to predictive results.
THE IDEA
Reality? What For?
I found no formal, Tetlock-like comprehensive study in economics journals. But, suspiciously, I found no paper trumpeting economists’ ability to produce reliable projections. So I reviewed what articles and working papers in economics I could find. They collectively show no convincing evidence that economists as a community have an ability to predict, and, if they have some ability, their predictions are at best just slightly better than random ones—not good enough to help with serious decisions.
The most interesting test of how academic methods fare in the real world was run by Spyros Makridakis, who spent part of his career managing competitions between forecasters who practice a “scientific method” called econometrics—an approach that combines economic theory with statistical measurements. Simply put, he made people forecast in real life and then he judged their accuracy. This led to the series of “M-Competitions” he ran, with assistance from Michele Hibon, of which M3 was the third, completed in 1999 and the latest discussed in this passage. Makridakis and Hibon reached the sad conclusion that “statistically sophisticated or complex methods do not necessarily provide more accurate forecasts than simpler ones.”
I had an identical experience in my quant days—the foreign scientist with the throaty accent spending his nights on a computer doing complicated mathematics rarely fares better than a cabdriver using the simplest methods within his reach. The problem is that we focus on the rare occasion when these methods work and almost never on their far more numerous failures. I kept begging anyone who would listen to me: “Hey, I am an uncomplicated, no-nonsense fellow from Amioun, Lebanon, and have trouble understanding why something is considered valuable if it requires running computers overnight but does not enable me to predict better than any other guy from Amioun.” The only reactions I got from these colleagues were related to the geography and history of Amioun rather than a no-nonsense explanation of their business. Here again, you see the narrative fallacy at work, except that in place of journalistic stories you have the more dire situation of the “scientists” with a Russian accent looking in the rearview mirror, narrating with equations, and refusing to look ahead because he may get too dizzy. The econometrician Robert Engle, an otherwise charming gentleman, developed ARCH, a predecessor of GARCH, and received a Nobel for his work on time-varying volatility. My objection is that mathematical sophistication should not be rewarded without convincing predictive performance. Simpler, less sexy methods can be hard to beat, but they do not take you to Stockholm. You have an expert problem in Stockholm, and I will discuss it in Chapter 17.
This unfitness of complicated methods seems to apply to all methods. Another study effectively tested practitioners of something called game theory, in which the most notorious player is John Nash, the schizophrenic mathematician made famous by the film A Beautiful Mind. Sadly, for all the intellectual appeal of these methods and all the media attention, its practitioners are no better at predicting than university students.
There is another problem, and it is a little more worrisome. Makridakis and Hibon were to find out that the strong empirical evidence of their studies has been ignored by theoretical statisticians. Furthermore, they encountered shocking hostility toward their empirical verifications. “Instead [statisticians] have concentrated their efforts in building more sophisticated models without regard to the ability of such models to more accurately predict real-life data,” Makridakis and Hibon write.
Someone may counter with the following argument: Perhaps economists’ forecasts create feedback that cancels their effect (this is called the Lucas critique, after the economist Robert Lucas). Let’s say economists predict inflation; in response to these expectations the Federal Reserve acts and lowers inflation. So you cannot judge the forecast accuracy in economics as you would with other events. I agree with this point, but I do not believe that it is the cause of the economists’ failure to predict. The world is far too complicated for their discipline.
When an economist fails to predict outliers he often invokes the issue of earthquakes or revolutions, claiming that he is not into geodesics, atmospheric sciences, or political science, instead of incorporating these fields into his studies and accepting that his field does not exist in isolation. Economics is the most insular of fields; it is the one that quotes least from outside itself! Economics is perhaps the subject that currently has the highest number of philistine scholars—scholarship without erudition and natural curiosity can close your mind and lead to the fragmentation of disciplines.
When to use it
Evaluating economic or financial forecasts: Instead of trusting complex models, compare them to a naive 'no change' or historical average prediction.
Business decisions: compare a model with a simple baseline on data that were not used to fit or select it.
Policy analysis: Recognize that economists’ predictions about the effects of policy changes may be no better than educated guesses, and consider a range of possible outcomes.
Forecast review: ask what a prediction adds beyond a simple baseline, which errors matter for the decision, and how performance changes across conditions.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
M3 Competition Results
Makridakis and Hibon’s M3 competition (1999) showed that statistically sophisticated or complex methods do not necessarily produce more accurate forecasts than simpler ones, challenging the value of econometric modeling.
Game Theory Practitioners vs. Students
Taleb cites an unnamed study in which game-theory practitioners predicted outcomes no better than university students. Without the study’s task and methods, this should not be generalized to every use of game theory.
Personal Quant Experience
Nassim Taleb recounts that complex quantitative methods run overnight rarely outperformed simple approaches used by a cabdriver, highlighting the narrative fallacy in believing in sophisticated models.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
When faced with a forecasting task, how can you check whether a complex method is actually adding value over a simple baseline?
Think of a time you or your organization relied on a sophisticated model. Did it outperform a simple guess? Why or why not?
Why might experts resist empirical evidence that simpler methods work better? What cognitive biases are at play?
Often confused with
References
- M3 Competition — Spyros Makridakis and Michele Hibon (1999)
- GARCH model — Robert Engel (1982)
- Lucas critique — Robert Lucas (1976)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)