How-Do-I-Feel-About-It? Heuristic
The 'How-do-I-feel-about-it?' heuristic describes how people rely on their current feelings as a source of information when making judgments. This can lead to biased decisions when feelings stem from unrelated sources, but it can also be adaptive when feelings accurately reflect reactions to the target.
THE IDEA
Feelings can influence judgment in two ways: by changing which information comes to mind, or by serving as information themselves. The mood-as-information approach focuses on the second route, the “How-do-I-feel-about-it?” heuristic. A feeling may be useful when it reflects a reaction to the thing being judged. It can mislead when an unrelated mood is mistaken for that reaction. Making the mood’s actual source apparent can reduce this effect.
People are especially likely to use the “How-do-I-feel-about-it?” heuristic when the judgment concerns their own preferences, when they know little else about the subject, or when a complex task, time pressure, or competing demands leave little attention for analysis. Judging overall life satisfaction, for example, requires more information than judging satisfaction with housing. A current mood offers a quick answer to the broader question.
In the research discussed here, drawing attention to a mood’s source was more effective for sad participants than happy ones. The authors connect this difference to processing style: happy moods tend to encourage reliance on existing knowledge and shortcuts, while sad moods tend to encourage closer attention to details. They suggest that people use mood as a signal about their surroundings. A good mood can suggest that things are going well; a bad mood can suggest a problem requiring scrutiny. These effects can change when people question the mood’s relevance or receive other goals or instructions. The usefulness of a processing style depends on the task.
Mood-congruent recall is a different route to biased judgment. Here, mood affects which memories or details come to mind during a more deliberate assessment. This route requires enough time and attention to retrieve and consider those details. Mood can therefore influence both quick judgments and effortful analysis. Studies that do not test what happens when people recognize a mood’s unrelated source may leave the mechanism unclear.
Feelings can also help people decide. In the card-game research discussed here, healthy participants developed negative emotional reactions to disadvantageous choices and began avoiding them before they could explain why. The finding is consistent with the claim that “preferences need no inferences.” Patients with prefrontal damage affecting emotional responses continued making disadvantageous choices even after gaining conscious insight into the problem.
The practical question is whether a feeling provides useful information about this decision. Optimism caused by sunny weather may say little about an investment. Discomfort that develops as someone learns the consequences of a choice may be relevant. Assessing that connection is difficult, just as assessing the relevance of factual information can be.
When to use it
Evaluating a job offer when you are in a good or bad mood.
Deciding whether to trust a new acquaintance based on initial feelings.
Assessing overall life satisfaction versus satisfaction with a specific aspect of life.
Making quick judgments under time pressure, such as in a buying decision.
An investor deciding whether to buy stocks on a sunny day might feel optimistic and overestimate returns.
A job interviewer might misattribute their positive mood to a candidate when it actually stems from the weather.
A consumer might rely on their positive feeling about a product advertisement, even if the product itself is not well-suited to their needs.
A manager notices a bad mood before a difficult decision and checks whether it reflects a problem with the proposal or an unrelated event.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Life Satisfaction vs. Domain Satisfaction
Judgments of general life satisfaction are more influenced by mood (e.g., sunny weather improving reported happiness) than judgments of specific domains like income or housing, for which objective comparison information is readily available (Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987).
Misattribution and Mood
In a study by Schwarz and Clore (1983), participants in a sad mood were more likely to correct for a misattribution manipulation (e.g., attributing their mood to the weather) than happy participants, who continued to rely on their feelings despite the manipulation.
Card Game Study
In a study by Bechera et al. (1997), healthy individuals developed negative affective reactions to disadvantageous moves in a card game and began avoiding them before conscious awareness, whereas patients with prefrontal cortex damage (impaired emotional reactions) continued making disadvantageous moves even after gaining conscious insight.
Sunny Day Investment
An investor may feel optimistic on a sunny day and overestimate likely asset returns, misattributing their positive mood to the investment rather than the weather.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
When have you made a judgment based on how you felt, only to later realize the feeling was irrelevant?
When do time pressure, unfamiliarity, or a complex choice make you more likely to use a feeling as a shortcut?
Does your mood seem to supply an overall verdict, or does it change which details you recall?
When making a decision, ask yourself: Is my current feeling actually relevant to the choice at hand, or could it be due to an unrelated cause?
How might your mood influence the way you process information for a complex task?
When has a gut feeling helped you notice a problem before you could explain it? What later evidence supported or challenged that feeling?
Often confused with
References
- Clore & Byrne — Clore, G. L., & Byrne, D. (1974)
- Srull — Srull, T. K. (1983)
- Borg — Borg, I. (1987)
- Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner — Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Kommer, D., & Wagner, D. (1987)
- Siemer & Reisenzein — Siemer, M., & Reisenzein, R. (1998)
- Schwarz & Clore — Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983)
- Forgas — Forgas, J. P. (1995)
- Schwarz (in press) — Schwarz, N.
- Descartes' Error — Damasio, A. R. (1994)
- Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences — Zajonc, R. B. (1980)
- The role of emotion in decision making: Evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage — Bechera, A., Damasio, H., Tramel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997)
- In press — Schwarz, N. & Skurnik, I.
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)