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Mental Models

Gray Swan

Fractal randomness can transform some Black Swans into Gray Swans by allowing us to model extreme events, but not all surprises can be eliminated. The distinction lies between modelable extreme events (Gray) and completely unforeseen events (Black).

THE IDEA

WHERE IS THE GRAY SWAN?

I have written this entire book about the Black Swan. This is not because I am in love with the Black Swan; as a humanist, I hate it. I hate most of the unfairness and damage it causes. Thus I would like to eliminate many Black Swans, or at least to mitigate their effects and be protected from them. Fractal randomness is a way to reduce these surprises, to make some of the swans appear possible, so to speak, to make us aware of their consequences, to make them gray. But fractal randomness does not yield precise answers. The benefits are as follows. If you know that the stock market can crash, as it did in 1987, then such an event is not a Black Swan. The crash of 1987 is not an outlier if you use a fractal with an exponent of three. If you know that biotech companies can deliver a megablockbuster drug, bigger than all we’ve had so far, then it won’t be a Black Swan, and you will not be surprised, should that drug appear.

Thus Mandelbrot’s fractals allow us to account for a few Black Swans, but not all. I said earlier that some Black Swans arise because we ignore sources of randomness. Others arise when we overestimate the fractal exponent. A gray swan concerns modelable extreme events, a black swan is about unknown unknowns.

I sat down and discussed this with the great man, and it became, as usual, a linguistic game. In Chapter 9 I presented the distinction economists make between Knightian uncertainty (incomputable) and Knightian risk (computable); this distinction cannot be so original an idea to be absent in our vocabulary, and so we looked for it in French. Mandelbrot mentioned one of his friends and prototypical heroes, the aristocratic mathematician Marcel-Paul Schützenberger, a fine erudite who (like this author) was easily bored and could not work on problems beyond their point of diminishing returns. Schützenberger insisted on the clear-cut distinction in the French language between hasard and fortuit. Hasard, from the Arabic az-zahr, implies, like alea, dice—tractable randomness; fortuit is my Black Swan—the purely accidental and unforeseen. We went to the Petit Robert dictionary; the distinction effectively exists there. Fortuit seems to correspond to my epistemic opacity, l’imprévu et non quantifiable; hasard to the more ludic type of uncertainty that was proposed by the Chevalier de Méré in the early gambling literature. Remarkably, the Arabs may have introduced another word to the business of uncertainty: rizk, meaning property.

I repeat: Mandelbrot deals with gray swans; I deal with the Black Swan. So Mandelbrot domesticated many of my Black Swans, but not all of them, not completely. But he shows us a glimmer of hope with his method, a way to start thinking about the problems of uncertainty. You are indeed much safer if you know where the wild animals are.

* The nontechnical reader can skip from here until the end of the chapter.

* By using symmetry we could also examine the incidences below the number.

* Clearly, you do not observe 100 percent in a finite sample.

* The defense mechanism when you question their work is to say that they “do science, not philosophy” and to berate my approach of worrying about model errors. This is a common trap: people think that science is about formulating predictions (even when wrong). To me, science is about how not to be a sucker.

Chapter Seventeen

LOCKE’S MADMEN, OR BELL CURVES IN THE WRONG PLACES *

When to use it

  • Investing in financial markets where extreme crashes are possible but can be modeled with power-law distributions.

  • Planning for pandemics or natural disasters where historical data may show non-Gaussian distributions.

  • Evaluating the potential for breakthrough technologies in biotech or energy where outcomes follow heavy-tailed distributions.

  • Assessing geopolitical risks where events like wars or revolutions might be modeled with fractals.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Stock market crash of 1987

If you know that the stock market can crash, as it did in 1987, then such an event is not a Black Swan. The crash of 1987 is not an outlier if you use a fractal with an exponent of three.

02

Biotech megablockbuster drug

If you know that biotech companies can deliver a megablockbuster drug, bigger than all we’ve had so far, then it won’t be a Black Swan, and you will not be surprised should that drug appear.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Can you think of a recent extreme event that was considered a Black Swan but could have been modeled as a Gray Swan if we had used fractal analysis?

  2. How does understanding the distinction between Gray and Black Swans change your approach to risk management?

  3. In what areas of life do you assume all surprises are unknowable, when some might be modelable?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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