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Cognitive Biases

Features of Hypotheses: Evaluative Quality and Self-Relevance

This concept describes two key features of hypotheses—evaluative quality (positive vs. negative framing) and self-relevance (hypotheses about oneself vs. others)—that systematically influence how people recruit evidence and judge support, often leading to motivated reasoning and biased conclusions.

THE IDEA

Features of Hypotheses

The Evaluative Quality of the Hypothesis. One feature that may have a systematic effect on support is the valence of a hypothesis – whether it is framed in positive or negative terms. Experimental variations of valence could be implemented via framing manipulations where the event stays constant (e.g., contrasting the judged likelihood that 9 of 10 patients survive their hospitalization to the judged likelihood that 1 of 10 patients does not). Alternatively, the valence of the event could be manipulated while changing the event itself. For example, consistent with past research on optimistic biases in judgment (e.g., Weinstein, 1980), people may be more willing (or more able) to recruit evidence supporting a positive hypothesis (“You will receive a very favorable evaluation from your boss”) than a corresponding negative hypothesis (“You will receive a very unfavorable evaluation from your boss”). Furthermore, the effect of the valence of a hypothesis may interact with other features of the hypothesis. For example, the size of unpacking effects may be greater for negatively framed hypotheses than for similar positively framed hypotheses, perhaps because people are more likely to spontaneously unpack the latter.

Self-Relevance of the Hypothesis. A second notable feature of a hypothesis that may have a systematic effect on support is the relevance of the hypothesis to oneself. For example, contrast the “(un)favorable evaluation from boss” hypotheses described previously with equivalent hypotheses framed in terms of a coworker rather than oneself. Because self-relevant information is typically more abundant than information about others, self-relevant hypotheses generally draw on larger bodies of evidence and consequently may lead to greater variability in support (e.g., hypotheses that match the evidence may yield very high support values, and hypotheses that do not match the evidence may yield very low support values). This conjecture about self-relevant hypotheses suggests that in general, support may tend to be more sensitive to other hypothesis features (e.g., valence) for self- than for other-framed hypotheses.

Both the evaluative quality and self-relevance of a hypothesis will generally contribute to the extent to which the judge wants to believe that the hypothesis is true. Kunda (1990) discusses how people who are motivated to reach certain conclusions attempt to construct (in a biased fashion) a compelling case for their favored hypothesis that would convince an impartial audience. Gilovich (2000) suggests that conclusions a person does not want to believe are held to a higher standard than conclusions a person wants to believe. In the former case, the person asks if the evidence compels one to accept the conclusion, whereas in the latter case, the person asks instead if the evidence allows one to accept the conclusion. Clearly, in many circumstances, the desirability of believing a hypothesis may markedly influence its perceived support.

When to use it

  • Medical decision-making: A doctor framing a treatment outcome as '90% survival' vs '10% mortality' may influence a patient's consent or choice.

  • Performance evaluations: Managers assessing their own performance vs. that of subordinates can be biased by self-relevance and valence.

  • Risk perception: When evaluating the likelihood of positive vs. negative events (e.g., winning a lottery vs. getting in a car accident), people often exhibit optimistic biases due to valence.

  • Legal judgments: Jurors may interpret evidence differently depending on whether the hypothesis is framed as the defendant's guilt (negative) or innocence (positive), and whether they identify with the defendant.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Patient Survival Framing (Valence)

People judge the likelihood that 9 out of 10 patients survive their hospitalization as higher than the equivalent statement that 1 out of 10 dies, even though the events are logically identical. Positive vs. negative framing changes perceived support.

02

Self vs. Coworker Evaluation (Self-Relevance)

When considering the hypothesis that you will receive a favorable evaluation from your boss, you may readily recall past praise and positive feedback, leading to high support. But when the same hypothesis is framed for a coworker, you have less personal experience to draw on, so support may be weaker and less variable.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Think of a recent decision where you evaluated a hypothesis about yourself (e.g., your performance on a test). How did the valence (positive or negative framing) affect your judgment of the likelihood?

  2. Can you recall a situation where you held a hypothesis about someone else to a different standard than a similar hypothesis about yourself? What does that reveal about the role of self-relevance?

  3. When you strongly desired a certain outcome (e.g., a job offer), how did that desire influence the evidence you considered or the way you weighed it? Did you ask if the evidence compelled or merely allowed the conclusion?

References

  1. — Weinstein (1980)

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)
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