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Mental Models

Causal Opacity and Preferences Revealed

Skin in the game reveals true preferences through action rather than words, solving the epistemological problem of causal opacity. It defines rationality by survival and leverages the Intelligence of Time to filter fragile systems, making doing more reliable than understanding.

THE IDEA

Causal Opacity and Preferences Revealed fn3

Let us now take the epistemological dimension of skin in the game to an even higher level. Skin in the game is about the real world, not appearances. As per Fat Tony’s motto:

You do not want to win an argument. You want to win.

Indeed you need to win whatever you are after: money, territory, the heart of a grammar specialist, or a (pink) convertible car. For focusing just on words puts one on a very dangerous slope, since

We are much better at doing than understanding.

There is a difference between a charlatan and a genuinely skilled member of society, say that between a macrobull***ter political “scientist” and a plumber, or between a journalist and a mafia made man. The doer wins by doing, not convincing. Entire fields (say economics and other social sciences) become themselves charlatanic because of the absence of skin in the game connecting them back to earth (while the participants argue about “science”). Chapter 9 shows how they will develop elaborate rituals, titles, protocols, and formalities to hide this deficit.

You may not know in your mind where you are going, but you know it by doing.

Even economics is based on the notion of “revealed preferences.” What people “think” is not relevant—you want to avoid entering the mushy-soft and self-looping discipline of psychology. People’s “explanations” for what they do are just words, stories they tell themselves, not the business of proper science. What they do, on the other hand, is tangible and measurable and that’s what we should focus on. This axiom, perhaps even principle, is very powerful but is not followed too much by researchers. Revelation of preferences is best understood by the betrothed: a diamond, particularly when it is onerous to the buyer, is vastly more convincing a commitment (and much less reversible) than a verbal promise.

As to forecasting, fuhgetaboud it:

Forecasting (in words) bears no relation to speculation (in deeds).

I personally know rich horrible forecasters and poor “good” forecasters. Because what matters in life isn’t how frequently one is “right” about outcomes, but how much one makes when one is right. Being wrong, when it is not costly, doesn’t count—in a way that’s similar to trial-and-error mechanisms of research.

Exposures in real life, outside of games, are always too complicated to reduce to a well-defined “event” easy to describe in words. Outcomes in real life are not as in a baseball game, reduced to a binary win-or-lose outcome. Many exposures are highly nonlinear: you may be beneficially exposed to rain, but not to floods. The exact argument is flushed out in this author’s technical works. Take for now that forecasting, especially when done with “science,” is often the last refuge of the charlatan, and has been so since the beginning of times.

Further, there is something called the inverse problem in mathematics, which is solved by—and only by—skin in the game. I will simplify for now as follows: it is harder for us to reverse-engineer than engineer; we see the result of evolutionary forces but cannot replicate them owing to their causal opacity. We can only run such processes forward. The very operation of Time (which we capitalize) and its irreversibility requires the filtering from skin in the game.

Skin in the game helps to solve the Black Swan problem and other matters of uncertainty at the level of both the individual and the collective: what has survived has revealed its robustness to Black Swan events and removing skin in the game disrupts such selection mechanisms. Without skin in the game, we fail to get the Intelligence of Time (a manifestation of the Lindy effect, which will get an entire chapter, and by which 1) time removes the fragile and keeps the robust, and 2) the life expectancy of the nonfragile lengthens with time). Ideas have, indirectly, skin in the game, and populations that harbor them do as well.

In that light—that of (causal) opacity and revelation of preferences— the Intelligence of Time under skin in the game even helps define rationality—the only definition of rationality I found that doesn’t fall apart under logical scrutiny. A practice may appear to be irrational to an overeducated and naive (but punctual) observer who works in the French Ministry of Planning, because we humans are not intelligent enough to understand it—but it has worked for a long time. Is it rational? We have no grounds to reject it. But we know what is patently irrational: what threatens the survival of the collective first, the individual second. And, from a statistical standpoint, going against nature (and its statistical significance) is irrational. In spite of the noise funded by pesticide and other technological companies, there is no known rigorous definition of rationality that makes rejection of the “natural” rational; to the contrary. By definition, what works cannot be irrational; about every single person I know who has chronically failed in business shares that mental block, the failure to realize that if something stupid works (and makes money), it cannot be stupid.

A system with skin-in-the-game requirements holds together through the notion of a sacrifice in order to protect the collective or entities higher in the hierarchy that are required to survive. “Survival talks and BS walks.” Or as Fat Tony would put it: “Survival tawks and BS wawks.” In other words:

What is rational is what allows the collective—entities meant to live for a long time—to survive.

Not what is called “rational” in some unrigorous psychology or social science book.fn4 In that sense, contrary to what psychologists and psycholophasters will tell you, some “overestimation” of tail risk is not irrational by any metric, as it is more than required overall for survival. There are some risks we just cannot afford to take. And there are other risks (of the type academics shun) that we cannot afford to not take. This dimension, which bears the name “ergodic,” is belabored in Chapter 19.

When to use it

  • In business, align incentives so that decision-makers bear the consequences of their actions (e.g., executives own stock, not just options).

  • In personal finance, use commitment devices that involve real stakes (e.g., putting money on a goal) to reveal true priorities and increase follow-through.

  • In public policy, require regulators and politicians to be subject to the same rules and outcomes as the citizens they govern.

  • In forecasting, evaluate predictions not by accuracy alone but by the payoff distribution—focus on asymmetric bets rather than frequency of being right.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Diamond as Commitment

A diamond ring, especially when costly to the buyer, is a more convincing commitment than a verbal promise because it reveals true preference through an irreversible action (skin in the game). Words are cheap; the diamond is tangible and costly.

02

Rich Forecasters vs. Poor Good Forecasters

The author notes knowing wealthy individuals who are terrible at forecasting (they are lucky or take asymmetric risks) and poor individuals who are good at predicting but lack the payoff. How often you are right matters less than how much you gain when right, echoing trial-and-error mechanisms.

03

Plumber vs. Political Scientist

A plumber's work is judged by results (functioning pipes) without need for convincing arguments, whereas a political 'scientist' may lack skin in the game and rely on elaborate rituals and titles. The doer wins by doing, not by convincing.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Think of a situation where someone's actions revealed their true preferences more clearly than their words. What did you learn from that discrepancy?

  2. How can you incorporate skin in the game into your own decision-making to avoid being a charlatan in your field?

  3. Why might it be rational to overestimate tail risks in certain contexts, even if it seems irrational to an observer without skin in the game?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

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Source texts

  • Skin In The Game Hidden Asymmetries In Daily Life (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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