Can a Whale Fly Like an Eagle?
Taleb argues that social-science models can cause harm when decision-makers ignore model error. He contrasts them with empirical regularities and with physical theories whose useful domains can be tested precisely.
THE IDEA
Can a Whale Fly Like an Eagle?
Social scientists and economists have no built-in consciousness of iatrogenics, and of course no name for it—when I decided to teach a class on model error in economics and finance, nobody took me or the idea seriously, and the few who did tried to block me, asking for “a theory” (as in Semmelweis’s story) and not realizing that it was precisely the errors of theory that I was addressing and cataloguing, as well as the very idea of using a theory without considering the impact of the possible errors from theory.
For a theory is a very dangerous thing to have.
And of course one can rigorously do science without it. What scientists call phenomenology is the observation of an empirical regularity without a visible theory for it. In the Triad, I put theories in the fragile category, phenomenology in the robust one. Theories are superfragile; they come and go, then come and go, then come and go again; phenomenologies stay, and I can’t believe people don’t realize that phenomenology is “robust” and usable, while theories, while overhyped, are unreliable for decision making—outside physics.
Physics is privileged; it is the exception, which makes its imitation by other disciplines similar to attempts to make a whale fly like an eagle. Errors in physics get smaller from theory to theory—so saying “Newton was wrong” is attention grabbing, good for lurid science journalism, but ultimately mendacious; it would be far more honest to say “Newton’s theory is imprecise in some specific cases.” Newtonian mechanics is remarkably useful in many everyday conditions. Its limits include relativistic speeds and strong gravitational fields, as well as phenomena requiring quantum mechanics; usefulness within a domain does not require universal accuracy. We also read nonsense-with-headlines to the effect that Einstein was “wrong” about that speed of light—and the tools used to prove him wrong are of such complication and such precision that they’ve demonstrated how inconsequential such a point will be for you and me in the near and far future.
On the other hand, social science seems to diverge from theory to theory. During the cold war, the University of Chicago was promoting laissez-faire theories, while the University of Moscow taught the exact opposite—but their respective physics departments were in convergence, if not total agreement. This is the reason I put social science theories in the left column of the Triad, as something superfragile for real-world decisions and unusable for risk analyses. The very designation “theory” is even upsetting. In social science we should call these constructs “chimeras” rather than theories.
We will have to construct a methodology to deal with these defects. We cannot afford to wait an additional twenty-four centuries. Unlike with medicine, where iatrogenics is distributed across the population (hence with Mediocristan effects), because of concentration of power, social science and policy iatrogenics can blow us up (hence, Extremistan).
When to use it
In economic policy, avoiding reliance on a single economic theory that may be fragile and cause iatrogenic effects.
In business decision-making, using empirical observations (phenomenology) rather than grand theories to guide strategy.
In risk analysis, being cautious of theories that could concentrate power and lead to extreme harm, as in social policy.
In scientific research, distinguishing between robust phenomenology and fragile theories to avoid overhyped conclusions.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Cold War Economic Theories
During the cold war, the University of Chicago promoted laissez-faire theories, while the University of Moscow taught the exact opposite. Their physics departments were in agreement, but social science theories diverged, showing fragility and unreliability for real-world decisions.
Newton and Einstein Precision
Newtonian mechanics remains useful within a broad everyday domain even though relativistic and quantum theories are needed in other conditions. Taleb uses this to challenge headlines declaring 'Newton was wrong' and to contrast physics with his view of social-science models.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
How can you identify when a theory is being applied outside its domain of validity?
In what situations might a theory cause more harm than good due to iatrogenics?
Why is phenomenology considered more robust than theory in social science?
Often confused with
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Antifragile (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)