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Mental Models

Big is Ugly—and Fragile

Taleb argues that scale can make a system more vulnerable to shocks and make its failure more costly to others. He criticizes mergers, efficiency pressures and government support that encourage large organizations to grow without accounting for that fragility.

THE IDEA

Big is Ugly—and Fragile

Mother Nature does not like anything too big. The largest land animal is the elephant, and there is a reason for that. If I went on a rampage and shot an elephant, I might be put in jail, and get yelled at by my mother, but I would hardly disturb the ecology of Mother Nature. On the other hand, my point about banks in Chapter 14—that if you shot a large bank, I would “shiver at the consequences” and that “if one falls, they all fall”—was subsequently illustrated by events: one bank failure, that of Lehman Brothers, in September 2008, brought down the entire edifice. Mother Nature does not limit the interactions between entities; it just limits the size of its units. (Hence my idea is not to stop globalization and ban the Internet; as we will see, much more stability would be achieved by stopping governments from helping companies when they become large and by giving back advantages to the small guy.)

But there is another reason for man-made structures not to get too large. The notion of “economies of scale”—that companies save money when they become large, hence more efficient—is often, apparently behind company expansions and mergers. It is prevalent in the collective consciousness without evidence for it; in fact, the evidence would suggest the opposite. Yet, for obvious reasons, people keep doing these mergers—they are not good for companies, they are good for Wall Street bonuses; a company getting larger is good for the CEO. Well, I realized that as they become larger, companies appear to be more “efficient,” but they are also much more vulnerable to outside contingencies, those contingencies commonly known as “Black Swans” after a book of that name. All that under the illusion of more stability. Add the fact that when companies are large, they need to optimize so as to satisfy Wall Street analysts. Wall Street analysts (MBA types) will pressure companies to sell the extra kidney and ditch insurance to raise their “earnings per share” and “improve their bottom line”—hence eventually contributing to their bankruptcy.

Charles Tapiero and I have shown mathematically that a certain class of unforeseen errors and random shocks hurts large organisms vastly more than smaller ones. In another paper, we computed the costs to society of such size; don’t forget that companies, when they fall, cost us.

The problem with governments is that they will tend to support these fragile organisms “because they are large employers” and because they have lobbyists, the kind of phony but visible advertised contributions so decried by Bastiat. Large companies get government support and become progressively larger and more fragile, and, in a way, run government, another prophetic view of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Hairdressers and small businesses on the other hand, fail without anyone caring about them; they need to be efficient and to obey the laws of nature.

When to use it

  • Evaluating a proposed merger or acquisition: consider whether the resulting entity becomes more fragile despite apparent efficiency gains.

  • Assessing government policy: deciding whether to bail out a large failing company or let it fail to preserve market health.

  • Personal investment: diversifying across many small, independent assets rather than concentrating in a few large ones.

  • Ecosystem management: preventing monocultures or overdominance of a single species to maintain overall stability.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Lehman Brothers collapse

Taleb uses the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 to illustrate how trouble at a large, interconnected bank can spread through a financial system.

02

Elephant vs. small organisms

Taleb contrasts the limited ecological effect he imagines from losing one elephant with the cascading effects of a major bank failure. The analogy supports his argument for limiting the size of vulnerable units.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. How might a large organization reduce its fragility by breaking into smaller, more autonomous units?

  2. In what ways do government subsidies and bailouts encourage the growth of fragile systems?

  3. Can you identify a 'Black Swan' event in your industry that would devastate a large player but leave smaller ones relatively unscathed?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

References

  1. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable — Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007)

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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