Actor–Observer Difference in Perceptions of Bias

ACTOR–OBSERVER DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTIONS OF BIAS

People may recognize or presume bias more readily in others’ judgments than in their own. This difference extends beyond accusations of self-interest or ideological bias. Even people who know about cognitive biases can apply that knowledge unevenly: their skill as “intuitive psychologists” may be directed chiefly at other people.

There is, of course, a long history of research comparing and contrasting the processes of social perception and self perception (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Bem, 1972; Nisbett & Ross, 1980, Chapter 9). Most relevant to present concerns, perhaps, is the suggestion by Jones and Nisbett (1971) that a variety of motivational, perceptual, and informational factors lead people to be more dispositionist – that is, more inclined to infer stable traits and dispositions while overlooking the determinative influence of situational or contextual factors – in the attributions they make about other people’s behavior than in the attributions they make about their own behavior. Andersen (1984; also Andersen & Ross, 1984) suggests a source of actor–observer differences in attributions that is particularly relevant to our present concerns. That source involves the access that actors enjoy to their private thoughts, feelings, and interpretations of stimuli. In particular, Andersen showed that people give heavy weight to such nonobservable events in stipulating the characteristics that are most revealing or even defining of them, but not in stipulating the characteristics that are revealing or defining of others.

In a somewhat similar vein, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) stressed the role of private experience in distinguishing between “inside” and “outside” perspectives in decision making. Actors’ predictions about their outcomes and prospects are likely to be heavily influenced by the access they enjoy to their own plans, goals, level of motivation or commitment, and by their awareness of the countermeasures they will take should any of several obstacles arise. Observers who lack such insider information, by contrast, are likely to ignore particular features of the case at hand. They give little weight to the actors’ expressions of confidence or even to the specifics of their plans and intentions, and give much heavier weight than the actor to base-rate information about the outcome of similar undertakings by this actor and others.

Consistent with this analysis, Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994, Study 5) found that although actors consistently commit the planning fallacy by underestimating how long it will take them to complete a given task, observers do not. Indeed, when provided with a description of a task and both the actor’s self-predicted completion time and relevant base-rate data (i.e., the actor’s memories of completion times for relevant previous tasks), observers tended to over estimate how long the actor would take. However, when the observers were exposed to the actor’s insider perspective (i.e., actor’s mental plans for completing the task), their estimates about completion time approached the actor’s own (unduly optimistic) estimates.

We note again, however, that our present concern lies not with differences between actor and observer assessments, or even with actor–observer differences in accuracy. Rather, our concern lies with the perceptions that people have about the status of their own assessments versus those offered by other people. In particular, as implied in our account of naive realism, we contend that people perceive their own views and sentiments about the world, and its problems and opportunities, to be more on target – and less susceptible to the various biases that afflict human judgment – than the views and sentiments of their peers.

There is a sense in which this proposition about invidious comparison of own versus other’s assessment of the world is a truism. In any particular assessment, one must feel that one’s particular assessment is the most reasonable one given the information at hand (otherwise, one presumably would adjust that assessment to make it more reasonable). Furthermore, because other actors necessarily offer some assessments that differ from our own, we are bound to feel that they are less wise and realistic than we are, at least until unfolding events impose a more objective and data-based standard for such comparisons.

Assessments made about the self are particularly pertinent to our present discussion. In such assessments, we are apt to regard the products of our own insider perspective as a gold standard against which assessments made by others can be measured. By contrast, in the case of assessments made about others, we are not apt to regard those individuals’ self-assessments as the standard against which our assessments or those of all other observers should be measured.

Consider the case of a female professor who gives the highest grade in the class to an unusually handsome young man who sat close to the front of the room, gazed intently at her throughout lectures, responded eagerly when she posed questions to the class, often came to her office to seek clarification of particular lecture points, and wrote an exceptionally long and interesting paper in fulfillment of the only formal course requirement. From the professor’s insider perspective, the student deserved the highest grade both because of his paper and because of his exemplary in-class contributions. Moreover, she is aware of specific steps she took to guarantee objectivity in grading and of the strong value she places on fairness. Now consider another student in the same class, one who sat quietly toward the back of the room and earned a lower grade in spite of what she felt to be a great deal of effort, and who personally has been unimpressed with the professor’s “star pupil” in a couple of conversations. This student is apt to be less certain about the professor’s objectivity. Furthermore, if the unimpressed peer makes her views about the male student known to the professor, or complains that the professor is a “sucker” for a handsome face and sycophantic behavior, and has succumbed to the “halo effect” in her grading of essays, the professor is very likely to believe that she understands the real source of the female student’s protests – perhaps better than the student herself.

Our characterization of naive realism and the biased assessments that people offer of their own and others’ capacity to discern the “truth” goes beyond matters of perceived objectivity. Even when an individual recognizes that her views are in part the product of her unique status or particular set of life experiences, the individual is apt to feel that her status and experiences have been a source of enlightenment rather than error.

A female administrator who defends the university’s decision to eliminate the men’s wrestling team and add a woman’s water polo team is apt to face a charge from her male colleagues that she has been biased by her gender. She, in turn, may acknowledge that her own experiences as a woman in university administration (and her earlier experiences as a star intramural softball player, with no opportunity to compete on a varsity team) played a role in shaping her present views and perhaps account for the passion with which she defends them. Yet she would vehemently deny that she is showing the kind of gender bias that her male counterparts showed for years in favoring an all-male athletic program. On the contrary, she would insist that her college and professional experiences help her to understand the magnitude of the disadvantages that women in general and women athletes in particular have faced. (At the same time, however, she may be relatively skeptical and sense the “same old” male gender bias when the wrestling coach talks of his own earlier frustrations as a student wrestler who received less support than athletes in revenue-producing sports, and insists that male wrestlers are currently being unfairly deprived of a valuable experience in order to meet an unfair gender quota.)

By the same token, members of various ethnic groups sometimes feel that only a member of their own group really understands the issues that affect them. However, they feel that members of other ethnic groups are hopelessly, if understandably, biased by their particular status and experiences, and cannot be given “veto power” over policies that affect them.

The question is whether people apply the same standards to their own judgments and those of others. Establishing a difference in perceived objectivity does not, by itself, establish that either side is more accurate.