Accessibility and Substitution (Attribute Substitution)
Attribute substitution is a heuristic where judgments about a target attribute are made by substituting a more accessible attribute, often automatically. This occurs when the target attribute is inaccessible, a related attribute is highly accessible, and the substitution is not overridden by System 2.
THE IDEA
Accessibility and Substitution
The intent to judge a target attribute initiates a search for a reasonable value. Sometimes this search terminates almost immediately because the required value can be read from a stored memory (e.g., the question, “How tall are you?”) or current experience (“How much do you like this cake?”). For other judgments, however, the target attribute does not come to mind immediately, but the search for it evokes the value of other attributes that are conceptually and associatively related (e.g., a question about overall happiness may retrieve the answer to a related question about satisfaction with a particular domain of life). Attribute substitution occurs when the target attribute is assessed by mapping the value of some other attribute on the target scale. This process will control judgment when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the target attribute is relatively inaccessible; (2) a semantically and associatively related attribute is highly accessible; and (3) the substitution of the heuristic attribute in the judgment is not rejected by the critical operations of System 2.
Natural Assessments
Some attributes are permanent candidates for the heuristic role because they are routinely evaluated as part of perception and comprehension, and therefore always accessible (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). These natural assessments include physical properties such as size and distance, and more abstract properties such as similarity (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), cognitive fluency in perception and memory (e.g., Jacoby and Dallas, 1991; Schwarz & Vaughn, Chapter 5, this volume; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), causal propensity (Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Heider, 1944; Michotte, 1963), surprisingness (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), affective valence (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, Chapter 23, this volume; Zajonc, 1980), and mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Temporary Accessibility
Other attributes are accessible only if they have been recently evoked or primed (see, e.g., Bargh et al., 1986; Higgins & Brendl, 1995). The 'romantic satisfaction heuristic' for judging happiness illustrates the effect of temporary accessibility. The same mechanism of attribute substitution is involved, whether the heuristic attribute is accessible chronically or only temporarily.
Example: Rattlesnakes vs. Bees
There is sometimes more than one candidate for the role of heuristic attribute. For an example borrowed from Anderson (1991), consider the question, “Are more deaths caused by rattlesnakes or bees?” A respondent who read recently about someone who died from a snakebite or bee sting may use the relative availability of instances of the two categories as a heuristic. If no instances come to mind, the respondent might consult impressions of the “dangerousness” of the typical snake or bee, an application of representativeness. Indeed, it is quite possible that the question initiates both a search for instances and an assessment of dangerousness, and that a contest of accessibility determines the role of the two heuristics in the final response. As Anderson observed, it is not always possible to determine a priori which heuristic governs the response to a particular problem.
When to use it
In consumer behavior, a shopper might judge the quality of a product based on its attractive packaging (a substitute for actual quality) because packaging is more accessible.
In medical diagnosis, a doctor might substitute a patient's most salient symptom (e.g., a loud cough) for a more comprehensive assessment, leading to a misdiagnosis.
When evaluating a job candidate, an interviewer might substitute the candidate's likability or attractiveness for relevant job skills, especially if those attributes are more accessible.
In public policy, citizens might judge the risk of a hazard (e.g., nuclear power) based on the vividness of a remembered accident (availability) rather than statistical data, leading to skewed risk perception.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Romantic Satisfaction Heuristic for Happiness
When asked 'How happy are you with your life overall?', a person might substitute a recent evaluation of their romantic satisfaction, especially if that domain was recently primed. This substitution occurs because the target attribute (overall happiness) is less accessible than the more specific and recently considered romantic satisfaction.
Rattlesnakes vs. Bees
To answer whether more deaths are caused by rattlesnakes or bees, a person might use availability (recalling a vivid news story about a snakebite) or representativeness (judging the dangerousness of a typical snake). The heuristic used depends on which attribute is more accessible at the moment, illustrating competition among heuristic attributes.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Think of a recent important decision you made. To what extent did you substitute an easily accessible attribute (like mood or a vivid example) for the actual target attribute you wanted to judge?
How might awareness of attribute substitution help you avoid biases in evaluating job candidates, products, or risks?
When trying to assess your overall life satisfaction, are you using a narrow substitute (e.g., recent work success) rather than a broader evaluation? How could you make the target attribute more accessible?
References
- Tversky and Kahneman (1983) – Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment — Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983)
- Tversky and Kahneman (1983) – Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases — Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983)
- Jacoby and Dallas (1991) – On the relationship between autobiographical memory and perceptual learning — Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1991)
- Schwarz and Vaughn (Chapter 5, this volume) – The role of fluency in judgment — Schwarz, N., & Vaughn, L.
- Kahneman and Varey (1990) – Propensities and counterfactuals: The loser that almost won — Kahneman, D., & Varey, C. (1990)
- Heider (1944) – Social perception and phenomenal causality — Heider, F. (1944)
- Michotte (1963) – The perception of causality — Michotte, A. (1963)
- Kahneman and Miller (1986) – Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives — Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986)
- Bargh (1997) – The automaticity of everyday life — Bargh, J. A. (1997)
- Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson (1993) – Rudimentary determinants of attitudes. II: Arm flexion and extension have differential effects on attitudes — Cacioppo, J. T., Priester, J. R., & Berntson, G. G. (1993)
- Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade (1999) – Economic preferences or attitude expressions? An analysis of dollar responses to public issues — Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., & Schkade, D. (1999)
- Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor (Chapter 23, this volume) – The affect heuristic — Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G.
- Zajonc (1980) – Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences — Zajonc, R. B. (1980)
- Schwarz & Clore (1983) – Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states — Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983)
- Bargh et al. (1986) – The additive nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility — Bargh, J. A., Bond, R. N., Lombardi, W. J., & Tota, M. E. (1986)
- Higgins & Brendl (1995) – Accessibility and applicability: Some 'activation rules' influencing the activation of chronic constructs — Higgins, E. T., & Brendl, C. M. (1995)
- Anderson (1991) – Is human cognition adaptive? — Anderson, J. R. (1991)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)